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We feel moral and emotional outrage about someone who deliberately and indiscriminately 
targets men, women, and children with the sole purpose of killing and maiming as many as 
possible by turning themselves into a human bomb. For most of us their actions are beyond 
rational comprehension, and we see suicide bombers as either mad or bad—or both.  
Christoph Reuter’s research on suicide bombing challenges us to re-think our ‘mad/bad’ 
response to the mindset behind a human bomb. He argues that it is too easy to see suicide 
bombing as just the work of ‘crazy fanatics’ or individuals who have been ‘brainwashed and 
programmed like some “booby-trapped automatons”’ (p. 109). Reuter debunks such myths by 
providing well documented qualitative data drawn from eight years of interviews with the 
families and organisations behind Islamic-motivated ‘martyrs’ in the Middle East.  
WMT and the Politics of Power  
Suicide bombers are Weapons of Mass Terror. They are a precise, highly effective, and 
(economically at least) relatively cheap instrument for spreading fear even when they don’t kill 
anyone else but themselves. Reuter highlights this when he recounts the story of twenty-eight 
year old Muhammad Mahmoud Nassr who walked into a Café in Haifa in northern Israel on 12 
August 2001 wearing enough explosives to cause carnage:  
Nassr approached a waitress at the café bar, lifted his T-shirt, and asked her if she 
knew what “that” was. People started screaming and throwing chairs in his direction; 
everyone rushed outside. … Nassr, alone in the empty café, cried “Allahu akbar” – 
God is great – and then blew himself up: his torso was ripped apart, while his head 
landed on a table. It was a baffling and, fortunately for those in the café at the time, 
futile attack. …. Yet what looked like failure concealed an urgent and hidden 
meaning: look at how easily I could terrify you (p. 4).  
The fact is suicide attacks are almost impossible to stop. These attacks expose the authorities as 
powerless to safeguard the public against such terror-inducing acts of violence by determined 
individuals.  
What makes the task of preventing suicide bombing even more daunting is that these determined 
individuals don’t fit any ‘profile’. Unlike criminal profiling where the success rate of profiling a 
serial killer is relatively good, the consensus emerging from research is that terrorist profiling is 
a very poor relative. Serial murderers leave their psychological ‘signature’ or ‘calling card’ 
behind at a crime scene because of the excessive psychological baggage and damage they carry 
around in their heads. Damage is usually due to developmental and/or cognitive dysfunctions 
they have been subjected to in the past. However, there is no such ‘psychological baggage’ to 
profile with a terrorist.  
Clearly some individuals who turn to terrorism have experienced significant trauma—we might 
consider here the Palestinians who are subjected to daily humiliation by the Israeli military. But 
trauma alone does not make a terrorist. The research evidence is clear that there is no such thing 
as a typical ‘terrorist profile’. Indeed, as Townshend notes, terrorists ‘emerge in most good 
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empirical studies as “disturbingly normal” people’ (2002, p. 16; see also Crenshaw 2003, p. 99). 
So diverse are terrorist minds that Rubenstein attests:  
Thankfully, the search for the ‘terrorist mind’ is now all but abandoned. As Walter 
Laqueur pointed out twenty-five years ago, the task is quixotic, seeing that among 
those engaging in political violence there exist so many varieties of terrorist 
organizations and behavior, sociocultural and political contexts for conflict, and 
diverse personality types (2003, p. 139).  
Williams reinforces this view by pointing out that ‘No comparative work on terrorist psychology 
has ever succeeded in revealing a particular psychological type or uniform terrorist mind-set’ 
(2002, p. 160).  
Reuter’s research reveals that this conclusion that a ‘terrorist profile’ does not exist applies even 
more to suicide bombers, especially in the Middle East:  
The original assumption – that suicide bombers were exclusively isolated, young, 
poor, ultra-religious people with no prospects – might have applied in some degree to 
the first attackers. But nowadays “none of this is right anymore,” admits Ephrahim 
Kam, a retired major of the Israeli military secret service who heads the Jaffe Center 
for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv (p. 109).  
The emergence of suicide bombing as the terror tactic of choice by Hezbollah (Party of God; a 
group of Lebanese Shi’ite militants) in the 1980s has long since been successfully exported to 
equally militant groups, both religious and secular, around the world.  
So trying to ‘pick’ the ‘suicide bomber’ in the crowd is a naïve and futile task. Reuter cites the 
biographies of dozens of suicide bombers that confirm there is no longer any way to draw a 
narrow profile of today’s would-be attacker (p. 109). He cites psychologist Ariel Merari of Tel 
Aviv University who argues that the more you look into the biographies, the more the clichés 
crumble about external factors such as poverty or loneliness playing any major role in 
determining the profile of a suicide bomber. They come from poor and wealth families, from 
among the working class and university graduates.  
Reuter concludes that the key motivating factor behind Palestinian suicide bombers is not 
poverty nor even religious fanaticism but rather their sense of powerlessness—‘the thwarting of 
these expectations’ (p. 10); expectations for their own land, their own state, their independence 
and freedom. For Reuter a terrorist mind is far from ‘crazy’ or ‘fanatical’. Suicide bombers 
exhibit ‘a calculated rationality which has concluded that armed struggle is the only way to get 
back their dignity and independence’ (p. 110).  
The Logic of a Terrorist Mind  
The logic behind this ‘calculated rationality’ is not one that most people would share. As Reuter 
points out, Palestinians understand only too well their obvious military inferiority to Israel but 
they also understand that Israelis, like all humans, want to live and are afraid of death. Suicide 
bombers have developed a mentality that abandons this natural will to live by embracing death. 
Hence, the essence of Reuter’s argument is that: ‘When this fearlessness is added to the 
dynamics of a calculated struggle for power, the old rules of [military] superiority, power, and 
deterrence simply fall away. Here is the Archimedean point by which we may understand suicide 
attacks’(p. 15).  
The mechanism Hamas and other militant terrorist groups use to ‘develop’ a mindset that 
abandons the natural will to live is religion. The religion of the Middle East is Islam. However, 
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any religious tradition can be used to serve the same purpose, as history shows: ‘Theological 
thinking that justifies acts of violence occurs on rare occasions in virtually every religious 
tradition. … The Christian, Jewish, Muslin, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist cultures … rely on … 
precedents and justifications for their own acts of religious violence’ (Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 
218).  
It is in the lifting of the sanction to kill one’s self that religion, of the fundamentalist kind, makes 
it potent and deadly contribution. Extreme interpretations of religious texts justify murder by 
suicide. This is why I think it is misleading to apply terms like ‘religiously-motivated’ terrorism 
to suicide bombing. It is more accurate to view ‘religion’ as the ‘justification’ of terrorism rather 
than the ‘motivation’ for it. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, then, Islamic fundamentalism just 
serves up a spiritual justification (martyr’s operations) for the bleakly depressing assessment by 
would-be suicide bombers and their radicalised organisations of the necessity for armed struggle.  
It is also wise to avoid confusing the distinctly Palestinian response of Hamas with Al Qaeda. 
Both use Islamic fundamentalism and suicide bombing to push their agenda but their agendas are 
not the same. Hamas is involved in the politics of power to establish a Palestinian State, whereas 
Al Qaeda feeds on the politics of hate with no political purpose other than to wage a jihad on 
anything remotely ‘Westernised’ including other Arab States like Saudi Arabia, which have in 
Bin Laden’s view defiled ‘true’ Islam.  
However, the justification for suicide bombing does not have to be exclusively or particularly 
‘religious’. Other writers on terrorism (Pavlova 2003, p. 31; Schweitzer & Shay 2003, p. 212; 
Wilkinson 2003, p. 122) make the same point as Reuter that the ‘cause’ can be either ‘secular’ as 
for the Tamil tigers or ‘religious’ as in radical Islamic fundamentalism or even extreme 
fundamentalist brands of Christianity like the Christian Identity movement in the United States 
(Barker 2003, p. 47; Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 218).  
Components of a Terrorist Mind 
This logic behind suicide bombing has several component parts. When these parts come together 
either by design or circumstance they have the capacity to form, prime, and activate a terrorist 
mindset.  
The first component is the socio-cultural and geopolitical context that drives psychological 
functioning and the shaping of individual motivation to sacrifice oneself in the service of a 
‘greater cause’, ‘higher call’, or to enter ‘Paradise’ early.  
This contextual requirement is a necessary first stage on the path to suicide bombing. The 
context spawns and maintains a ‘culture of violence’ (Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 60) at boiling 
point so that community approval for ‘martyr operations’ becomes well entrenched. Reuter cites 
survey research from the Middle East showing that: 
the level of approval for violence rises in line with the level of education. It’s not the 
mob, nor the illiterate, who are goaded into violence, but precisely the well-educated, 
well-informed people who conclude that armed struggle is the only way out of the 
current situation (p. 110). 
Once the context has primed the human bomb, the second component in the making of a terrorist 
mind comes into play—religious fundamentalism. As I’ve already argued, all major religions 
include advocates who push extreme fundamentalist interpretations of God and the world (see 
Rapoport 2003, p. 43; Wilkinson 2003, p. 122; Townshend 2002, p. 112; Barker 2003, p. 47; 
Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 218). These advocates avoid moderate interpretations of Islam, 
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Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, or Christianity along with democracy, capitalism, and 
the American way.  
What is interesting about Islam is the process used to distort Islamic texts; to use an oft quoted 
phrase with a different twist, it’s a WMD process. I am not talking about the biological/nuclear 
type of WMD bought into vogue by the Bush Administration mantra of ‘Saddam has Weapons 
of Mass Destruction’ and the subsequent Swiss-cheese justification for invading Iraq. The WMD 
I’m referring to are the Words of Mass Distortion that flow from militant mosques. 
Words of Mass Distortion are formed by radicalising the fundamentals of a religion or ideology. 
Charismatic and zealous leaders peak beguiling words of revenge and Jihad. They ask their 
followers: God has terror in His mind so why don’t you if you claim to be devout and dutiful? 
They are in the business of selling an idealised political-religious agenda of terror and they are 
good at it, if the number of volunteer ‘martyrs’ lining up is evidence.  
The third component of logic in the terrorist mind operates at the individual level—beliefs. 
Religious extremism is nothing new, but what is new is that large sections of the Islamic 
community believe it. There is little mileage in preaching fundamentalism if nobody listens.  
When the component parts of the terrorist mind bent on becoming a suicide bomber line up—a 
context and culture of violence, religious fundamentalism to justify terrorism through a Words of 
Mass Distortion process, and individuals with a set of beliefs and expectations that accept 
without question such religious distortions—then it’s a waiting game for the ‘martyr’ till the 
right moment for the ‘mission’ eventuates. 
Is a Solution Possible? 
Some comfort can be found in Reuter’s research, although not all commentators on terrorism 
would agree with the solution he proposes. Reuter draws hope from what has happened in post-
Khomeini Iran. After more than two decades of Iran’s ‘Islam solution’, it is clear that their 
experiment with a cleric-led dictatorship has failed to deliver anything like salvation for the 
Iranian people. Poverty, unemployment, and rampant corruption reached new heights in this 
promised Islamic ‘Paradise’ on earth. Reuter succinctly states the case: 
The moral dictatorship turned inspired believers into a jaded, disgusted, and fed-up 
populace. The Khomeini era’s praise for and popular acceptance of martyrdom was 
beaten down not by military means – the preferred (and not terribly successful) 
method of Israel and the United States vis-à-vis their Palestinian and Al-Qaeda 
jihadist foes – but by the Islamic state’s own limitations and contradictions (p. 172).  
For suicide bombing to continue unabated on the scale the West is experiencing it has to be 
‘officially’ sanctioned by radicalised Islamic clerics and to win popular support by the 
masses. Wise, well-informed, and co-operative foreign policy between Western nations, 
especially the dominant superpower of the United States, and Islamic societies is the only 
solution worth pursuing. Only by working together with Islamic societies can we secure 
long-term peace and security on the very small and fragile planet we share. Without 
solutions that integrate rather than divide, we can expect more volunteer ‘martyrs’ in 
defiance of an Israeli style security fence to line up at bus stops and walk into cafes and 
shopping centres with explosives strapped to their waist.  
People may find Reuter’s work unsettling because he seeks to understand this terrifying 
phenomenon rather than pass quick judgment on those who engage in it. His findings, if 
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not his solution for military restraint and patience, are consistent with what other scholars 
have found and so demand serious reflection.  
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